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Abstract Tax legislation included in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993 made large-scale investments in equity real estate
investment trusts (REITs) more desirable to institutional
investors. Other studies have observed an increased level of
institutional ownership in REITs during the timeframe following
passage of the act. Based on an analysis of equity REITs before
and after passage of the Act, the present study ﬁnds that its
passage coincided with a signiﬁcant change in the role of
unsystematic risk in the pricing of equity REITs.
Introduction
Tax legislation included in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 possessed the
potential to signiﬁcantly alter the investment clientele of real estate investment
trusts (REITs). The Act’s removal of a major tax barrier made large-scale
investments in equity REITs more desirable to institutional investors. Chan, Leung
and Wang (1998) found institutional ownership in REITs ranged from 12% to
14% between 1986 and 1992. They found institutional ownership increased to
17% 1993, 26% in 1994 and 30% in 1995. Chan, Leung and Wang (1998) note
that, given the change in the ownership structure of REITs, it would be worthwhile
to evaluate the effect of institutional ownership on the value of a REIT.
This article investigates the change in REIT pricing structure following passage
of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993. With institutional investors increasing
their ownership in the equity REIT market, their highly diversiﬁed nature should
cause unsystematic risk, which can be removed through diversiﬁcation, to become
less important in the pricing of equity REITs. The present study explores this
question and ﬁnds strong empirical evidence that, after enactment of the 1993
legislation, the risk structure of equity REIT pricing changed signiﬁcantly.
Speciﬁcally, this article examines the relative importance of unsystematic risk after
announcement of passage of the 1993 Act. In this context, unsystematic risk276  Crain, Cudd and Brown
represents variations in equity REIT returns unexplained by movement in the
market index (S&P500). Within a portfolio context, unsystematic risk reﬂects an
element of risk that can be removed through diversiﬁcation. The study results
demonstrate that, after announcement of the 1993 Act, the role of unsystematic
risk in explaining equity REIT returns declined signiﬁcantly, and the decline
continued to occur over subsequent time periods. This suggests that the change
may be permanent rather than temporary.
The initial section of this article provides a brief background on recent
securitization trends in real estate and the growth in REITs. The features of the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 that relate to REIT investments are presented
in the next section. The fundamentals of systematic and unsystematic risk are then
reviewed, followed by a description of the sample and methodology employed in
the study. Finally, the results of the analysis are presented and discussed, and the
implications of the ﬁndings are summarized.
 Growth in REIT Activity
During the last several years, there has been a tremendous increase in the
securitization of real estate. The vehicle of choice in these transactions has been
the equity REIT. As a result, the presence of equity REITs in the securities markets
is presently larger, both in number of ﬁrms and total market capitalization, than
at any time in history. As of March 31, 1999, there were 214 publicly-traded
REITs with a total market capitalization of over $131 billion. By contrast, in 1992,
total REIT capitalization was less than $16 billion.
Some of the reasons for the increase in securitization of real estate relate to an
increase in demand for real estate securities by investors while others involve
increases in the supply of real estate available for securitization. For example, the
improvement in the general health of real estate markets has helped spark
investors’ interest in real estate securities. Likewise, REITs, as the most easily
accessible form of real estate investment, have enjoyed additional popularity as a
result of real estate’s traditional role in contributing to portfolio diversiﬁcation;
although that role has not been clearly deﬁned in the literature (Burns and Epley,
1982; Kuhle, 1987; and Giliberto 1993).
In addition to its potential contribution to portfolio diversiﬁcation, real estate is
often extolled as a hedge against inﬂation. This claim has also met with mixed
results in the literature (Firstenberg, Ross and Zisler, 1988; Gyourko and
Linneman, 1988; Murphy and Klieman, 1989; Park, Mullineaux and Chew, 1990;
Chan, Hendershott and Sanders, 1990; Liu and Mei, 1992; and Glascock, Lu and
So, working paper). The popular perception of real estate as an inﬂation hedge,
however, has probably added further to the growing popularity of REITs among
investors.
Still other factors have affected the level of REIT activity by increasing the supply
of real estate available for securitization through REITs. For example, when realPricing Structure of Equity REITs  277
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estate ﬁrms that were traditionally highly-leveraged sought to reﬁnance large
amounts of debt, they found creditors had become much less amenable to the high
loan-to-value nonrecourse ﬁnancing that had been common in past commercial
real estate transactions. However, many of these ﬁrms discovered that they could
replace much of this debt ﬁnancing with equity capital created through formation
of publicly traded REITs (Gyourko, 1994). The advent of the Umbrella Partnership
REIT (UPREIT) has been another factor affecting the availability of real estate
for securitization by REIT formation. This relatively new type of REIT is
structured in such a way that property owners interested in taking their real estate
operations public can do so without incurring prohibitive capital gains taxes that
have typically resulted from such transactions in the past. Another possible factor
contributing to the increase in REIT activity, however, is the additional interest
by pension funds and other institutional investors spurred by tax law changes
incorporated in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993.
 Impact of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 on
REITs
Qualifying REITs have special tax status that generally allows them to avoid
payment of federal income taxes. This signiﬁcant tax advantage is accomplished,
however, only through compliance with a number of strict rules that primarily act
to restrict sources of income and retention of earnings. REITs must also comply
with another tax-related provision known as the ‘‘ﬁve or fewer’’ rule. In simple
terms, this rule disqualiﬁes a REIT from advantageous tax status if more than
50% of its shares are held by ﬁve or fewer shareholders. Prior to the 1993 Act,
it was largely this rule that had been blamed for limiting the level of institutional
investment interest in individual REITs.
Although institutional investors have often invested in real estate as an asset class,
these investments were frequently in some form of direct ownership interest. The
‘‘ﬁve or fewer’’ rule made it implausible for institutional investors such as pension
funds to invest signiﬁcant sums in the shares of individual REITs. Speciﬁcally,
prior to the change included in the 1993 Act, a pension fund was regarded as a
single individual shareholder for purposes of the ‘‘ﬁve or fewer’’ rule. Because
most REITs have relatively small market capitalizations, large institutional
investors found it difﬁcult to accumulate signiﬁcant investment positions in
individual REITs without placing them in violation of the ‘‘ﬁve or fewer’’ rule
and therefore endangering their advantageous tax status.
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, however, alleviates this problem by
modifying the ‘‘ﬁve or fewer’’ rule. The modiﬁcation allows each institutional
beneﬁciary such as a pension plan beneﬁciary, rather than the pension fund itself,
to be considered an individual REIT shareholder. Under the modiﬁed rules,
institutional investors that wish to make sizeable investments in REITs will be
less likely to place the REITs in danger of losing their advantageous tax status.
It was anticipated that passage of the Act would result in pension funds and other278  Crain, Cudd and Brown
institutions increasing their investment activity in REIT securities (Martin, 1993;
and Vinocur, December 5, 1994). Subsequent studies have observed an increase
in institutional ownership of REIT securities consistent with this expectation
(Chan, Leung, and Wang, 1998).
 Systematic vs. Unsystematic Risk
In a ﬁnancial market setting, risk is the level of uncertainty associated with the
expected return from an investment. Risk is usually measured by reference to
variation of returns. A portion of that variation in returns is associated with
movement in the market index (S&P500) and is referred to as systematic risk,
typically captured in the measure ‘beta.’ The remaining variation in investment
returns, that portion unexplained by variation in the market index, is referred to
as unsystematic risk. It is the measured change in the unsystematic risk of REIT
securities after passage of the Act that is the focus of this study.
A positive relationship is expected between risk and return. That is, investors
increase their required return as the perceived level of risk increases. Undiversiﬁed
investors must cope with both diversiﬁable and nondiversiﬁable components of
risk. (For the more diversiﬁed investor, unsystematic risk should be less
important.) Since institutional investors are extremely well diversiﬁed, their entry
into the REIT market (and the perception by the market of their expected entry)
should signiﬁcantly impact the risk-return relationship. As a result of the increased
institutional ownership in REITs made possible by the 1993 Act, unsystematic
risk should become less important in explaining REIT returns after the Act’s
enactment. This study offers an empirical examination of this event.
 Sample and Methodology
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of the increased institutional
ownership made possible by the 1993 Act on the pricing of REITs. The publicly
traded shares of equity REITs are used in this analysis. Equity REITs represent
entities that own and operate real estate, unlike mortgage or hybrid REITs that
are entirely or signiﬁcantly invested in real estate mortgages or mortgage
securities. While it has been found that interest rates are a signiﬁcant factor in
explaining returns of mortgage and hybrid REITs, equity REITs have been found
to more closely correlate with market index returns (Liang, McIntosh and Webb,
1995). As this article focuses on the components of risk as they relate to market
index returns, equity REITs are the logical group to analyze. In addition, virtually
all of the increased securitization of real estate through REIT formation in the
past few years has involved equity REITs. Of the $125 billion increase in REIT
market capitalization from 1992 to 1997, $117 billion is attributable to equity
REITs, many of which were newly formed after passage of the 1993 Act
(NAREIT).Pricing Structure of Equity REITs  279
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As a result of the inﬂuence of institutional investors in the REIT market, REIT
pricing should become more efﬁcient. Ambrose and Linneman (forthcoming) ﬁnd
that larger REITs have signiﬁcantly lower costs of capital than smaller REITs.
Raiman (1999) predicts that larger, more liquid REITs will be better able to attract
institutional investors at more efﬁcient prices and smaller REITs will have a more
difﬁcult time attracting equity investors. If institutional investors invest primarily
in REITs with larger market capitalizations, the increased efﬁciency in pricing
should be particularly evident in large REITs.
Since higher levels of institutional ownership should be associated with larger
REITs, our sample consists of REITs with total assets of at least $100 million
that trade on the NYSE or ASE. This initial screening produces thirty equity
REITs of sufﬁcient size that exist for the entire study period. Daily values for
security returns are drawn from the CRSP data tapes for each of the thirty equity
REITs. Five trading periods are analyzed. The ﬁrst trading period is identiﬁed as
the 180-day period leading up to passage of the Act, which occurred on September
10, 1993. The second trading period consists of the trading days between when
the Act was passed and when it was implemented (September 10, 1993 to January
1, 1994). The remaining three trading periods consist of three consecutive 180-
day periods following implementation of the Act (January 1, 1994 to June 30,
1994; July 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994; and January 1, 1995 to June 30, 1995).
The purpose of the ﬁnal three trading periods is to observe the permanency of the
change in the portfolio risk components.
A regression model is created for each of the thirty equity REITs for each trading
period, as follows:
k  a  bk  e , (1) it i i mt it
where:
kit  The return on REIT i for day t;
kmt  The return on the market index (S&P500) for day t;
aibi  The ordinary least squares parameters for REIT I; and
eit  The error term for REIT i for dayt .
The standard deviation of the error terms for each REIT, (ei), serves as the
measure of unsystematic risk, that portion of equity REIT risk not explained by
the market index.
An additional variable, the net debt ratio (NDR), is also determined for each REIT
for the ﬁscal year ended prior to the observation period.1 This variable, obtained
from the COMPUSTAT database, serves as a control variable for changes in the
combined effect of liquidity and debt leverage. A REIT’s liquidity and/or its debt280  Crain, Cudd and Brown
Exhibit 1  Sample Equity REITs
Ticker Name
CUZ Cousins Properties Inc.
HRE HRE Properties
WRE Washington Real Estate Investment Trust
MRY Merry Land & Investment Co Inc.
IRT IRT Property Co.
MGI MGI Properties Inc.
FRT Federal Realty Investment Trust
UDR United Dominion Realty Trust Inc.
NPR New Plan Realty Trust
BRE BRE Properties Inc.
PTR Property Trust America
RCT Real Estate Investment Trust CA
HCN Health Care REIT Inc.
WIR Western Investment Real Estate Trust
HCP Health Care Property Investments Inc.
WRI Weingarten Realty Investors
AHE American Health Properties Inc.
UHT Universal Health Realty Income Trust
BPP Burnham Paciﬁc Properties Inc.
MT Meditrust
leverage could change from one observation period to the next, and this could
also affect the volatility of its returns, although it would not be directly related to
the change in tax law. This procedure is performed for each of the ﬁve observation
periods.
It is necessary for selected REITs to be dropped from the sample. One of the
REITs (Duke Realty) is eliminated due to its initiation of a major reorganization
during the study period. The reorganization radically altered the deleted equity
REIT’s risk during the period of measurement, and its inclusion would corrupt
the sample. Seven other REITs are removed from the sample due to incomplete
data available from either CRSP or COMPUSTAT. Finally, two additional REITs
are removed from the sample as outliers because their variable values exceed
3 beyond the sample means. The resulting sample consists of twenty equity
REITs with complete data available for the ﬁve observation periods. The identities
of the twenty REITs are displayed in Exhibit 1.Pricing Structure of Equity REITs  281
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Exhibit 2  Sample Characteristics
NDR (ei)
Mean 0.336 0.012
Std. Dev. 0.181 0.003
Notes: N  20. NDR  The net debt ratio of equity REITs. (ei)  The standard deviation of residual
equity REIT return.






Square F Sig. of F
Covariate
NDR 0.707 1 0.707 0.097 0.756
Main Effect
PERIOD 130.552 4 32.638 4.498 0.002
Explained 131.259 5 26.252 3.618 0.005
Residual 682.119 94 7.257
Total 813.378 99 8.216
Notes: NDR  The net debt ratio of equity REITs. PERIOD  The time perid of observation.
 Results
An analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) procedure is then applied in which the
unsystematic risk measure, (ei), serves as the dependent variable, the net debt
ratio (NDR) serves as a covariate and the main effect representing the ﬁve different
time periods is captured in the variable, PERIOD. Descriptive statistics for sample
variables are displayed in Exhibit 2.
ANOVA results are displayed in Exhibit 3. The ANOVA results show that the
covariate is not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the sample of equity
REITs did not undertake signiﬁcant changes in their liquidity and leverage
structures over the ﬁve periods of observation.
The main effect (PERIOD), however, is highly signiﬁcant (at the .002 level). This
ﬁnding indicates that a signiﬁcant change in the level of unsystematic risk occurs282  Crain, Cudd and Brown
Exhibit 4  ANOVA Cell Means
Time Period Population 1 2 3 4 5
(eit) 12.66 14.57 12.83 12.62 12.22 11.06
Notes: N  20. (eit)  The standard deviation of residual equity REIT returns.
over the ﬁve periods of observation. Exhibit 4 displays the cell means for the
dependent variable for each of the ﬁve observation periods. The results show that
unsystematic risk, (ei), steadily drops after announcement of passage of the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993.2 The ﬁndings are consistent with the premise
that, after passage of the ACT, entry of institutional investors into the equity REIT
market would signiﬁcantly change the pricing structure of equity REITs.
Speciﬁcally, the greater presence of well-diversiﬁed institutional investors in the
equity REIT market is consistent with the diminishing role of unsystematic risk
in explaining equity REIT returns.
The largest drop in unsystematic risk appears to occur during the period
immediately following announcement of passage of the legislation. This may
reﬂect anticipation of the ultimate entry of institutional investors into the equity
REIT market. The observed continual drop in the unsystematic risk measure is
consistent with institutional investors gradually building positions in the equity
REIT market over time, as predicted by Singer (1994) and Ciandella (1995), rather
than a wholesale ﬂood of entry immediately after implementation of the Act.
Chan, Leung and Wang (1998) ﬁnd that levels of institutional ownership did
increase during the study period. Another source indicates that pension funds alone
have poured over six billion dollars of new capital into REITs from 1992 through
1996 (Dohrmann, 1997).
 Conclusion
Liang, McIntosh and Webb (1995), report intertemporal changes in REIT riskiness
as a result of signiﬁcant tax law changes. Consistent with that ﬁnding, the present
study shows that passage of the 1993 Act coincided with a signiﬁcant change in
the pricing of large equity REITs. Speciﬁcally, unsystematic risk is a less
signiﬁcant element of equity REIT risk, and consequently, unsystematic risk plays
a lesser role in the pricing of equity REITs. A plausible source of this change is
the entry and/or anticipated entry of well-diversiﬁed institutional investors into
the equity REIT market. The effect on unsystematic risk did not all occur with
announcement of passage of the Act, but rather steadily declined over time, which
is consistent with the steady increase of institutional ownership in equity REITs
observed by Chan, Leung and Wang (1998).Pricing Structure of Equity REITs  283
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The observed change in the pricing structure of large equity REITs associated
with greater institutional ownership is consistent with the ﬁndings of McDonald,
Nixon and Slawson (2000) who analyze bid-ask spreads and funds-from-
operations announcements during 1995 and 1996 and conclude that large REITs
are more stable and efﬁciently priced. Likewise, the enhanced role of systematic
risk in the pricing of equity REITs conforms with the results of Glascock, Lu and
So (2000). They use cointegration to evaluate the long-term relationship of REIT
returns to returns on unsecuritized real estate, bonds and stocks and conclude that
equity REITs behave more like stocks after 1992.
The ﬁndings of the present study have important implications for portfolio
managers interested in evaluating the risk of REIT securities. However, the policy
implications are important to all investors. The results indicate a decreased role
for unsystematic risk in equity REIT pricing. Consequently, those investors who
are less diversiﬁed should expect to be more greatly penalized, receiving less
compensation for bearing the unsystematic risk associated with equity REIT
investments.
The change in equity REIT pricing associated with the 1993 Act should also
impact the policies of equity REIT managers. The increased inﬂuence of
institutional investors in the equity REIT market should make equity REIT
investments more liquid, a product of additional investors and the subsequent
increase in trading frequency. In addition, the expected change in the investor
clientele of equity REITs should alter the ﬁnancing strategies used by equity REIT
managers. As indicated, equity REITs should be relatively more attractive to
ﬁnancial institutions and less attractive to less diversiﬁed investors. Consequently,
equity REIT managers should market their securities with these considerations in
mind.
 Endnotes
1 Net debt is deﬁned as total debt less cash and equivalents. The net debt ratio (NDR)i s
the ratio of net debt to total assets, as follows:
Total Debt  Cash & Equivalents
NDR  .
Total Assets
2 The following OLS regression model is also used to test for differences in the residual
standard deviation before and after passage: (ei)  0  1NDR  2PD2  3PD3
 4PD4  5PD5, where NDR is the net debt ratio and PD2, PD3, PD4 and PD5 are
dummy variables representing the second, third, fourth and ﬁfth 180-day trading period,
respectively. If unsystematic risk is less important in the pricing of equity REITs after
passage, 2, 3, 4 and 5 will be negative. The regression results indicate that 1 is not
statistically signiﬁcant, but 2 through 5 are all negative and signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
Furthermore, the p-value decreases with each time period (5 is signiﬁcant at the .0001
level). This is consistent with a decreasing standard deviation of the residuals over time,
which is the result of the ANOVA.284  Crain, Cudd and Brown
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